Export Controls and Non-proliferation Regimes in the Post-Cold War World
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
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The international security environment has undergone tremendous change over the past few years. The United States is faced today with an entirely new set of threats and opportunities. As a result, the need to revamp our export control system has taken on a new sense of urgency. I would like to take this opportunity to address the question of why the United States will continue export controls in the post-Cold War world and introduce how our draft Export Administration Act contributes both to the economic security of Americans and our non-proliferation goals. In the past, we and our allies had a clear understanding of the need for export controls. The Warsaw Pact countries, as well as other communist countries, posed a serious and clearly defined threat to the United States and to the West generally. We undertook to deny them access to weapons, dual-use items, and technologies. We and our allies agreed upon procedures for controlling exports to these destinations, including allowing for any nation to veto a specific export. Now we face a very different threat. There are still serious dangers, but there are more uncertainties. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated conventional arms is perhaps the single most important security threat. The demand for such weapons remains high, as in Iran and Libya. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the New Independent States in Central and Eastern Europe have new commercial incentives to expand trade in arms and sensitive dual-use items. In many cases, they also inherit weak control systems. Our export control system for the post-Cold War world needs to respond to these new security threats. This article discusses the Clinton Administrations approach to export controls and nonproliferation.
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