Accession Number:

ADA485612

Title:

Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang

Descriptive Note:

Monograph rept. Jul 2007-May 2008

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

• LaRonde, J. S.

Report Date:

2008-05-22

Pagination or Media Count:

95.0

Abstract:

In 1949, following the conclusion of its revolutionary war against the Chinese Nationalist forces, the Peoples Liberation Army PLA peacefully occupied Chinas western most province of Xinjiang. For nearly sixty years, the PLA has conducted a counterinsurgency against several, mostly Uyghur-led, separatist movements. Despite periods of significant violence, particularly in the early 1950s and again in the 1990s, the separatist forces have not gained momentum and remained at a level one insurgency. Mao ZeDeng is revered as a master insurgent and the father of Fourth Generation Warfare. Strategists in armies worldwide study his writings on revolutionary and guerilla warfare. This monograph concludes that Mao, as well as the communist leaders who followed him, was also successful at waging protracted counterinsurgency. For nearly sixty years, separatist movements in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan have all failed. This monograph analyzes the conflict in Xinjiang and concludes that the Chinese continue to defeat the separatist movement in Xinjiang through a strategy that counters Maos seven fundamentals of revolutionary warfare.

Descriptors:

• *CHINA
• *COUNTERINSURGENCY
• MILITARY DOCTRINE
• CONFLICT
• INSURGENCY
• GUERRILLA WARFARE
• LEADERSHIP
• MILITARY STRATEGY
• COMMUNISM

Subject Categories:

• Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE