Accession Number:

ADA482612

Title:

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Rand Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 4

Descriptive Note:

Monograph

Corporate Author:

RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2008-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

178.0

Abstract:

Following the initial success of U.S. and Afghan forces in overthrowing the Taliban regime in 2001, an increasingly violent insurgency began to develop. A mixed group of insurgents comprised of the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters, local tribes, and criminal organizations began a sustained effort to overthrow the Afghan government. U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan offer a useful opportunity to assess what works-and what does not- in counterinsurgency warfare. This study examines the beginning of the insurgency in Afghanistan and asks three major questions. First, what was the nature of the insurgency Second, what factors have contributed to the rise of insurgencies more broadly and to the insurgency in Afghanistan in particular Third, what capabilities should the U.S. military consider developing to improve its ability to wage effective counterinsurgency operations

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE