El Salvador, Iraq, and Strategic Considerations for Counterinsurgency
Strategy research project
ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Pagination or Media Count:
Considered by many a successful counterinsurgent effort, the El Salvador counterinsurgency experience has a number of lessons for both the policymaker and the military strategist. This experience in counterinsurgency and regime change in El Salvador during the 1980s is prescient, and this paper examines the strategic environment of El Salvador and U.S. interests in El Salvador during that tumultuous period. The seven dimensions of the Manwaring paradigm are introduced and utilized as the backdrop for analysis of U.S. involvement in El Salvador from a strategic perspective. In the course of the analysis, legitimacy, unity of effort, and time are highlighted as the most poignant dimensions of the El Salvador counterinsurgency effort. They are also utilized to draw conclusions about the relevance of the El Salvador counterinsurgency to that of Iraq, specifically, and to counterinsurgency in general. This paper offers that these three dimensions-legitimacy, unity of effort, and time-should be codified as mandatory considerations for the policymaker and military strategist in the formulation of political and military objectives, particularly in those situations where insurgency is possible.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics