Accession Number:

ADA476613

Title:

The Worst Disaster: The Decisive Point and the Fall of Singapore

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2007-11-06

Pagination or Media Count:

23.0

Abstract:

Britain allowed Japan to seize the island fortress of Singapore by neglecting the decisive points associated with Singapores defense. Analysis of Britains defensive preparations reveals several complexities associated with decisive points. Decisive points can emerge. These new decisive points may be difficult to identify and even more difficult to prove to strategic commanders. One new decisive point may lead to another and updated planning is required with these decisive points in mind. Also, emerging decisive points elevate risk. With the emergence of a new decisive point, the commanders objectives grow without an immediate and comparable increase in forces. Finally, an operational commander may not be able to act on a decisive point due to political or strategic reasons. As demonstrated in the defense of Singapore, neglect of decisive points can lead to military disaster.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Safety Engineering
  • Defense Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE