Strategic Intelligence Observations from the Pre-Vietnam and Pre-9/11 Periods for the Intelligence Professional and the Policy-Maker
Mono. rept. Jul 2006-May 2007
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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This study investigates strategic intelligence failures of the pre-Vietnam and pre-911 time periods. The monograph presents PEMISI political, economic, military, information, societal, and intelligence environmental analyses of both time periods in order toevaluate whether intelligence lessons are truly similar in both periods. The intelligence observations presented are not an exhaustive representation of the U. S. Governments intelligence lessons from these two periods. Rather they are collected from comprehensive and quality studies of Vietnam and the 911 Commission Report and other sources. The resulting evidence suggests that five intelligence issues are similar between the two periods. A critical look at the similarities and disparities is made as a conclusion with the warning that contextual considerations are imperative for proper application of remedies. The monograph recommends historical education for analysts of intelligence pitfalls throughout history. Additionally, a caution is offered to policy-makers against the politicization of intelligence and need to understand and trust in the processes and professionals of the intelligence community.
- Government and Political Science
- Military Intelligence