Transitions in Full Spectrum Operations: The Effects of Ethos
Monograph rept. Jul 2006-Mar 2007
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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During OIF in 2003, the Army demonstrated its unrivaled ability to overmatch an enemy in a conventional mechanized conflict. By all accounts, the Armys participation in the decisive operation phase of the campaign was a stunning success. Just as in Desert Storm, the Army validated its warfighting ethos built on sound doctrine and years of hard training. How did success in the initial phases of OIF fail to translate into success for the campaign This monograph contends that the missteps following the initial success can be attributed to the same ethos that provided the tactical victory. In spite of the Armys operational concept of full spectrum operations, the tactical culture blinded the Army leaders to the requirements to transition from offense to stability operations and caused a loss of initiative yet to be regained. To correct the ethos and align it with the full spectrum operations concept, the Army must address the deficiencies in doctrine and develop training scenarios that stress the importance of transitioning between offense, defense, and stability operation.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics