From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
CAMBRIDGE UNIV (UNITED KINGDOM) COMPUTER LAB
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The literature contains a variety of different mixes, some of which have been used in deployed anonymity systems. We explore their anonymity and message delay properties, and show how to mount active attacks against them by altering the traffic between the mixes. We show that if certain mixes are used, such attacks cannot destroy the anonymity of a particular message completely. We work out the cost of these attacks in terms of the number of messages the attacker must insert into the network and the time he must spend. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of these mixes and the settings in which their use is appropriate. Finally, we look at dummy traffic and Stop-and-Go SG mixes as other promising ways of protecting against the attacks, point out potential weaknesses in existing designs, and suggest improvements.
- Computer Systems Management and Standards