Accession Number:

ADA465331

Title:

Proxies for Anonymous Routing

Descriptive Note:

Conference paper

Corporate Author:

NAVAL RESEARCH LAB WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR HIGH ASSURANCE COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHACS)

Report Date:

1996-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

11.0

Abstract:

Using traffic analysis, it is possible to infer who is talking to whom over a public network. This paper describes a flexible communications infrastructure, onion routing, which is resistant to traffic analysis. Onion routing lives just beneath the application layer, and is designed to interface with a wide variety of unmodified Internet services by means of proxies. Onion routing has been implemented on Sun Solaris 2.4 in addition, proxies for World Wide Web browsing HTTP, remote logins RLOGIN, e-mail SMTP, and file transfers FTP have been implemented. Onion routing provides application independent, real-time, and bi-directional anonymous connections that are resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Applications making use of onion routings anonymous connections may and usually should identify their users over the anonymous connection. User anonymity may be layered on top of the anonymous connections by removing identifying information from the data stream. Our goal here is anonymous connections, not anonymous communication. The use of a packet switched public network should not automatically reveal who is talking to whom. This is the traffic analysis that onion routing complicates.

Subject Categories:

  • Information Science
  • Statistics and Probability

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE