A Formal Language for Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
NAVAL RESEARCH LAB WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR HIGH ASSURANCE COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHACS)
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In this paper we present a formal language for specifying and reasoning about cryptographic protocol requirements. We give sets of requirements for key distribution protocols and for key agreement protocols in that language. We look at a key agreement protocol due to Aziz and Diffe that might meet those requirements and show how to specify it in the language of the NRL Protocol Analyzer. We also show how to map our formal requirements to the language of the NRL Protocol Analyzer and use the Analyzer to show that the protocol meets those requirements. In other words, we use the Analyzer to assess the validity of the formulae that make up the requirements in models of the protocol. Our analysis reveals an implicit assumption about implementations of the protocol and reveals subtleties in the kinds of requirements one might specify for similar protocols.
- Computer Systems Management and Standards