Accession Number:

ADA465039

Title:

Merging Paradigms of Survivability and Security: Stochastic Faults and Designed Faults

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

NAVAL RESEARCH LAB WASHINGTON DC

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2003-08-18

Pagination or Media Count:

13.0

Abstract:

Faults are examined by both the security and fault tolerance communities. These communities have strikingly different views of the types of faults that exist, the way they are modeled, and how they are addressed. One community can pronounce a system survivable but the other community would not find this to be so. This leaves us with two approaches that both fail to be comprehensive, depending on which community is looking at the system. While intrusion-tolerance and security researchers look at faults in terms of statistically dependent events caused by the hard intruder, the fault tolerance literature assumes that faults are statistically independent and can be described as random variables with probability distributions. When considering the survivability of a system, we cannot assume that the system is susceptible to only one type of fault or the other, but this is common practice in both communities. A new paradigm is needed.

Subject Categories:

  • Computer Programming and Software

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE