Accession Number:

ADA464897

Title:

Reforming the Interagency at the Operational Level

Descriptive Note:

Research paper

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2005-02-14

Pagination or Media Count:

26.0

Abstract:

The informal and ad hoc construct of the interagency process at the operational, specifically regional, level of command is insufficient to meet the changed security environment of the post-Soviet world. Attempts to formalize the process through creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups JIACG at the Regional Commands are likewise inadequate. To ensure unity of effort across all levels of command, the U.S. Government must create unified interagency staffs at each of the regional commands to augment or replace the present military-centric Combatant Commands, mandate mechanisms to ensure adequate staffing and resources are directed to the regional staffs, align interagency operating areas, and utilize existing interagency planning documents across the interagency process. This paper examines the development of interagency operations in the past decade and Presidential Directives issued to govern the interagency process. The present response to the interagency, the JIACG, will then be evaluated along with the reform proposals of the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS. Based upon the analysis, suggested reforms and the conditions necessary for implementation will be proposed and counterarguments addressed. The United States will remain heavily engaged in crisis mitigation, humanitarian assistance, counter-proliferation, and counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. As such, the institutions that serve at the front lines of U.S. efforts in the global community must adapt. The present construct of the Regional Combatant Commands and the ability of the interagency process to successfully meet the ever-changing security environment have proved inadequate throughout the past two decades. The JIACGs lack directive authority, adequate resources, and unity of effort. The interagency process must be reconfigured to ensure an optimal response that solidifies unity of effort across all agency boundaries.

Subject Categories:

  • Administration and Management
  • Government and Political Science
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE