Accession Number:

ADA464624

Title:

Joint Doctrine for Stability and Reconstruction Operations

Descriptive Note:

Research paper

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2005-02-14

Pagination or Media Count:

22.0

Abstract:

Joint Doctrine provides inadequate planning guidance for closing the critical seam between combat operations and post-hostilities security and reconstruction. While the importance of linking military objectives to the desired end-state has been addressed through recent updates, a review of current joint planning doctrine still indicates critical deficiencies. First, the guidance provided in Joint Publications JP for planning joint operations -- JP 3-0, JP 3-08 series, JP 5-00 series, and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System JOPES -- lacks continuity. Second, the deliberate planning process and Crisis Action Planning process outlined in JOPES lags the requirements implied in the National Security Strategy. Third, JOPES should be adjusted to delineate a regressive approach to planning joint operations. Finally, JOPES -- indeed all joint planning doctrine -- also lags institutional changes and growth within the Department of Defense DoD and the Department of State DoS. Through an examination of the results of postconflict, or phase IV, operations to date during Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF, it will be apparent that recent changes made to joint doctrine have been insufficient in changing the actual planning process. Additionally, without cooperative, interagency planning, postconflict stability and reconstruction operations will continue to hold high costs in terms of U.S. lives and treasure.

Subject Categories:

  • Administration and Management
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE