Accession Number:

ADA463748

Title:

Partnering with the Former Enemy's Military during Stability and Security Operations: A Critical Operational Decision

Descriptive Note:

Research paper

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2005-05-17

Pagination or Media Count:

23.0

Abstract:

In future conflicts, strategic and operational commanders must make the determination to disband or use the former enemys military during the post-combat Stability and Security Operations SASO phase. Although not practical in every conflict, there will be wars, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom-1 OIF-1, in which using the former military as part of the occupation force is the right decision. To prepare for future use of the enemys military, the operational commander should follow the CENTCOM model used in preparation for OIF-1 by conducting integrated psychological, information, and intelligence operations targeting the willingness of susceptible enemy units to partner with Coalition Forces. Commanders must have a prepared plan, task organization, and maneuver concept that capitalize on the enemy soldiers readiness to be co-opted by the Coalition and quickly transition individual soldiers and units into partners. Within 4 months of the end of major combat operations, former enemy forces should be employed as constabulary units and used in economy of force missions in areas more accepting to the American-led occupation. A 20-to-1,000 occupation force-to-civilian ratio is necessary in nation-building operations for an overwhelming occupation force presence to be felt by the defeated nation. Strong security measures i.e., martial law must be enforced to maintain a high level of security. This will deter an insurgency and convince the civilian population that the former regime was defeated and that the occupation force is capable of maintaining security during the reconstruction process. Operational commanders should use the former military to augment the Coalition Force. This study analyzes the pros and cons of disbanding the Iraqi Army during OIF-1, and recommends to future operational commanders that under the right conditions, such as existed during OIF-1, they use former enemy soldiers to augment coalition forces during the post-combat SASO phase.

Subject Categories:

  • Personnel Management and Labor Relations
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE