Accession Number:

ADA463562

Title:

A Forgotten Lesson for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations: The Combined Action Program

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2006-05-16

Pagination or Media Count:

28.0

Abstract:

This research identifies and analyzes the Marine Corps Combined Action Program in the Vietnam War, how it was initiated and employed in a counterinsurgency strategy, and whether this concept has any validity in todays counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. As this program developed over time, it proved successful in disrupting multiple tenets of the Vietnam insurgency. This program started in 1965 throughout the Marine Corps area of operations but did not receive support from the operational commander and his staff, therefore a unified strategy to defeat the insurgency never materialized. Critical to success for the operational commander in irregular warfare is first having an understanding of its nature, assisted by historical analysis, and then applying the proper solution to the problem. The Combined Action Program alone cannot defeat the insurgency but a contemporary program will provide US military leaders a supporting strategy as they continue counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE