Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination
Final rept. Aug 2001-Oct 2004
CALIFORNIA UNIV BERKELEY DEPT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Pagination or Media Count:
We study a classical question in a modern context. There are a number of buyers and sellers of a number of distinct goods. Each participant is selfish- It cares more for its own benefit than of the social welfare. Each good is indivisible. It must go completely to one of the participants. Moreover, the participants are not passive as Smith 157 and Walras 167 believed, but actively take actions to further their interest in the spirit of Cournot 27 and Edgeworth 37, and later, von Neumann and Morgenstern 117 and Nash 116. We are thus interested in the following questions. When does an equilibrium exist in a market with several indivisible goods And what economic mechanisms yield an allocation that promotes the welfare of the society as a whole To put it more concretely, we want to examine the existence of competitive equilibrium a combinatorial market, i.e., an exchange economy with several indivisible goods such that consumers have interdependent valuations A consumers utility is for a bundle of indivisible goods. Further, we seek auction or market mechanisms that yield social welfare maximizing allocations when participants or agents exercise strategic behavior. Despite this being a long standing question, it has only been incompletely resolved for the setting of interest. The following problems from communication networks and operations research motivated this work.
- Statistics and Probability
- Radio Communications