Accession Number:

ADA439311

Title:

Applying Doubly Labeled Transition Systems to the Refinement Paradox

Descriptive Note:

Doctoral thesis

Corporate Author:

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Personal Author(s):

• Bibighaus, David L.

Report Date:

2005-09-01

Pagination or Media Count:

161.0

Abstract:

Possibilistic Security Properties are widely used in the development of high-assurance security models. However, while a model may possess a security property, an implementation of the model is not guaranteed to possess the property. The author argues that the choice of a framework, and its associated definition of refinement, is critical to ensure that an implementation maintains the security property. The author shows how to use the Doubly Labeled Transition Systems to reason about possibilistic security properties and refinement. He compares this framework to three other process algebra frameworks and shows how his framework and security model preserves the security of the largest class of systems. As a consequence of this framework, he shows how his security property links confidentiality to availability.

Descriptors:

• *SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
• *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY
• *INFORMATION SECURITY
• *INFORMATION ASSURANCE
• COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
• VERIFICATION
• ALGEBRA
• THESES
• TRANSITIONS

Subject Categories:

• Information Science
• Computer Programming and Software
• Computer Systems Management and Standards

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE