Toward a Common Cultural Bias: The Operational Art and CFLCC Planning for OIF
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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The overall intent of this monograph is to examine an operational warfighting headquarters CFLCC to show the degree to which its contemporary commanders and core planners exhibited a common cultural bias or operational mindedness in their operational design for execution. In doing so, it suggests that not only does this common cultural bias exist, but that future success in the U.S. Armys ability to design and execute operational warfare will continue to be a function of its ability to further develop this operational mindedness within the future officer corps. This paper should therefore provide the reader with an increased understanding and appreciation for the U.S. Armys ability to conduct operational art as a function of an operational consciousness, which manifests itself through commanders and planners who create operational designs in adherence to theoretically and historically informed doctrinal principles that are descriptive and not prescriptive. Such principles are inculcated through the service by means of education, training, and practice in preparation for execution. The authors hypothesis is that the U.S. Armys overwhelming success in the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF Phase III, Decisive Operations, was not a function of haphazard coincidence. Instead, it was largely due to the existence of a developed common cultural bias or operational mindedness, which was envisioned in the early 1980s and is now being manifested in real world operations like OIF.
- Administration and Management
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics