Unconventional Warfare and Operational Art: Can We Achieve Continuity in Command and Control?
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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This monograph focuses on the gap in operational command and control for unconventional warfare operations UW, and the organizational elements required to mitigate this gap. In the 20th Century and beyond, the United States conducted UW in the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, and the War on Terror. After each war, the United States command and control structure for planning, organizing, and leading UW was dismantled, and valuable experience and continuity were lost. Subsequently, at the outset of each conflict, Special Operations Forces have been forced to build an operational command and control mechanism tailored to the requirements of each UW situation. A joint command and control organizational model for unconventional warfare at the operational level will provide an appropriate means to bridge this gap. This monograph concludes that in order to plan, organize, and lead UW operations, the U.S. must establish a focal point within the geographical combatant commands that would leverage all joint and interagency capabilities and resources required to plan, organize, and lead UW operations. Creating regional JIATF-UWs will leverage the capabilities of the nations military manpower and resources to wage successful UW, and offers a solution to the continuity gap in SOFs ability to command and control joint unconventional warfare at the operational level of war.
- Unconventional Warfare
- Command, Control and Communications Systems