Accession Number:

ADA429323

Title:

Far More Intellectual Than a Bayonet Charge: The Need for Joint Unconventional Warfare Doctrine

Descriptive Note:

Monograph

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2004-05-26

Pagination or Media Count:

60.0

Abstract:

This monograph investigates whether the U.S. military should establish joint doctrine for unconventional warfare. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, joint doctrine has become central to everything the U.S. military does. Training, education, programs, procurement, and war planning are all guided by joint doctrine. Since the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan began, it has been clear that unconventional warfare is relevant to the U.S. military. Because unconventional warfare is a relevant mission, and joint doctrine is central to military operations, it is relevant and timely to ask if the U.S. military needs joint doctrine for unconventional warfare. The monograph first establishes criteria for determining whether joint doctrine is appropriate for a task. The five criteria are as follows Does UW involve the employment of joint forces Does UW fit the demands of law, policy, or joint capstone or keystone doctrine Is UW normally conducted as a multinational or interagency effort Does the lack of joint doctrine for UW hamper joint training and education on UW and Will a lack of joint doctrine for UW lead to other operational or organizational problems Next, the monograph examines existing joint and Service doctrine for UW to determine if it is sufficient. The doctrine is found to be insufficient for UW. The author then compares the uses of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures TTP to the recommended doctrinal components to determine which one is more appropriate. Based upon these findings, the author concludes that the U.S. military should publish a new joint TTP manual for UW. He also recommends changes to existing joint doctrinal manuals that the U.S. Special Operations Command be the lead agent for the new doctrine and that the work of Bard ONeill, rather than Mao Tse-tung, be used as the theoretical basis of U.S. military insurgency and UW doctrine. 121 refs.

Subject Categories:

  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE