Bringing the Box into Doctrine: Joint Doctrine and the Kill Box
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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Since the dawn of modern warfare, commanders have sought ways to maximize the combined effects of maneuver and firepower. In the early years of mechanization and aircraft, the struggle to define the roles of these new weapon systems prevented anything more than ad hoc attempts to synchronize their effects. It would take a tragedy during the Normandy campaign of the Second World War to motivate the Army and its post-war counterpart, the Air Force, to formalize air-ground coordination procedures. Describing these procedures is now the responsibility of joint and service doctrine, but on the topic of commanding, controlling, and synchronizing operational fires, both remain deficient. Most notably, the inability of doctrine to provide clarity and a common philosophy concerning the fire support coordination line has led to confusion and allowed a debate over the purpose and placement of this fire support coordinating measure to detract from joint interoperability. To compensate for this shortcoming, some components of the joint force have developed the kill box to supplement or potentially replace the fire support coordination line. This paper seeks to evaluate the kill box, determine its utility as a joint coordination measure, and make a recommendation on its role in joint doctrine. 4 tables, 7 figures, 106 refs.
- Humanities and History
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics