Accession Number:

ADA415801

Title:

Principles of Information Operations: A Recommended Addition to U.S. Army Doctrine

Descriptive Note:

Monograph rept. 18 Jun 2002-22 May 2003

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2003-05-22

Pagination or Media Count:

71.0

Abstract:

It is imperative that Army doctrine fulfill its mandate to create common understanding across the force. This includes establishing a common basis for conducting IO across the spectrum of conflict. Army IO doctrine must provide commanders and their staffs the foundation necessary to effectively integrate IO into full spectrum operations. Without successful IO, achieving information superiority is unlikely. Without information superiority, the Army is at risk of failing to accomplish its assigned missions in the decisive manner that is expected and necessary. The soon to be released FM 3-13, Information Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, represents a leap ahead in Army thinking about IO. It is particularly good at describing the IO threat and how the IO elements and related activities interact. It also presents numerous and detailed tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting planning, preparing, executing and assessing IO. Still, this monograph asserts that FM 3-13 lacks a general, macro-level articulation of how IO elements are combined, so it needs to add a set of principles that guide commanders and staffs on how to combine the IO elements. This monograph seeks to discover whether or not existing U.S., Russian, and Chinese doctrine and theory can provide the sought after guidance on combining IO elements. The answer is yes. An analysis of all three nations writings on IO, and synthesis of the related ideas, shows they do offer potential solutions to the problem. These solutions are offered as recommended improvements to the ongoing Army IO doctrine debate. The monograph subscribes to the idea that IO is an integrating strategy, relating means to ends. Combining the elements is the essential part of this strategy, and must be guided by six principles. First, commanders and staffs must understand and leverage all three domIn making the case for these principles, the monograph covers several key areas. It discusses the I

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Command, Control and Communications Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE