Accession Number:

ADA411324

Title:

Two-Sided Matching for the US Navy's Enlisted Detailing Process: A Comparison of Deferred Acceptance and Linear Programming Via Simulation

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis

Corporate Author:

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2002-12-01

Pagination or Media Count:

106.0

Abstract:

Recent studies of 2-sided matching mechanisms have suggested potential benefits for implementation into the Navy enlisted assignment process. The proposed matching process improves the chance of commands and sailors being assigned to a party of choice. The same studies focused on a particular two-sided Deferred Acceptance DA matching algorithm which ensures stable matches, prevents off-the-site trades between the matching parties and upholds integrity of the matching system. Although stable matches are important in a voluntary labor market, the DA algorithm may still favor one party depending on whether the command or sailor biased form of the algorithm is used.

Subject Categories:

  • Personnel Management and Labor Relations
  • Numerical Mathematics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE