Homeland Biological Warfare Consequence Management: Capabilities and Needs Assessment
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
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In recent years, concern over potential terrorist WMD acts in the U.S. has blossomed. Since 1995, the U.S. has passed legislation and published presidential decision directives designed to address the U.S. capabilities to respond to such an incident. Additionally, millions of dollars have been spent on domestic preparedness. Yet the numerous agencies involved FEMA, DoJ, DoD, HHS, etc. make a comprehensive, organized solution to the problem difficult. Focusing on the consequence management functions incident identification, unity of effort, containment, treatment, security, fatality management and social response, the capabilities and shortfalls of local, state and federal assets are examined. This paper highlights significant progress in areas including treatment supply stockpiles and surge capability by the federal government and National Guard to support local efforts. However, the analysis also identifies gaps in local planning, public health surveillance, supply and equipment distribution, and lack of general public education. Additionally, the analysis indicates that initial efforts and financial support for overarching federal programs and surge capability have come at the detriment of local and state improvements. These shortfalls if not corrected may impair our ability to respond to a biological warfare incident.
- Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare