Accession Number:

ADA399238

Title:

Can We Ever Build Survivable Systems from COTS Components?

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST

Personal Author(s):

• Lipson, Howard F.
• Mead, Nancy R.
• Moore, Andrew P.

Report Date:

2001-12-01

Pagination or Media Count:

33.0

Abstract:

Using commercial off-the-shelf COTS components to build large, complex systems has become the standard way that systems are designed and implemented by government and industry. Much of the literature on COTS-based systems concedes that such systems are not suitable for mission-critical applications. However, there is considerable evidence that COTS-based systems are being used in domains where significant economic damage and even loss of life are possible in the event of a major system failure or compromise. Can we ever build such systems so that the risks are commensurate with those typically taken in other areas of life and commerce This paper describes a risk-mitigation framework for deciding when and how COTS components can be used to build survivable systems. Successful application of the framework requires working with vendors to reduce the risks associated with using the vendors products, and improving and making the best use of your own organizations risk- management skills.

Descriptors:

• *COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS
• *SURVIVABILITY
• *OFF THE SHELF EQUIPMENT
• *COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT
• *COMPUTER NETWORKS
• *ELECTRONIC SECURITY
• INDUSTRIES
• ORGANIZATIONS
• RISK
• MANAGEMENT
• SKILLS
• DAMAGE
• ECONOMICS
• FAILURE
• MISSIONS
• VENDORS
• DEATH

Subject Categories:

• Computer Systems Management and Standards
• Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE