Accession Number:

ADA394103

Title:

Military Intelligence Support to the Division Commander: Visualizing the Battlefield

Descriptive Note:

Monograph Aug 2000-Feb 2001

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2001-02-01

Pagination or Media Count:

49.0

Abstract:

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, identifies that in 2001 military forces must control the tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war MOOTW. Adding to the complexity of operational control is the broad range of information that technology can deliver to the division commander. Technology allows the commander to expand his ability to view the battlefield and gather inputs from subordinate commanders and staff. The growing complexity makes it vital that the commander identify what information is important and clearly and concisely portray that information to his staff. With the increased importance of a clear and accurate vision, the G2, as head of the division intelligence effort, must ensure the commander is thoroughly grounded in the understanding of the opposition and of the environment in which the division will operate. Military intelligence doctrine provides for many different products and procedures to give the commander a baseline of information to develop his vision. The monograph will determine if current intelligence doctrine provides the commander with the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command as outlined in FM 3-0 DRAG. The elements of operational design are introduced as part of visualization in the visualize, describe, and direct aspects of leadership. The elements of operational design are tools to aid in designing major operations and provide a linkage of ends, ways, and means. The monograph concludes that current intelligence doctrine does not provide the division commander the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command. The lack of clear identification of enemy centers of gravity prevents the commander from arraying the remaining elements of operational design to devise an effective operation to accomplish his endstate. Revisions of intelligence doctrine are necessary to fully support the commander and the provisions of FM 3-0. c

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE