Accession Number:

ADA389114

Title:

The Dardanelles Campaign - Failure Through Strategic Indecision

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s):

• Cariker, Thomas L.

Report Date:

2001-04-10

Pagination or Media Count:

61.0

Abstract:

At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States faces a strategic paradox as our national strategy relies increasingly on military engagement and intervention, our forward basing and presence is decreasing. This reality, combined with shifting of populations and centers of gravity to the littorals and proliferation of anti-access strategies, makes power projection and operational maneuver from the sea a strategically relevant capability. As we prepare for the eventuality of projecting power from the sea, the lessons of the Dardanelles campaign during World War I offers invaluable insight on the feasibility of the employment of amphibious forces in pursuit of current strategic goals. Using a cause and effect model, this study examines the impact of strategic decisions on the national, theater, and operational level during the Dardanelles campaign. It also explores the campaigns influence on subsequent amphibious doctrine and the implications for Operational Maneuver from the Sea OMFTS and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver STOM.

Descriptors:

• *MILITARY STRATEGY
• *DECISION MAKING
• *NAVAL OPERATIONS
• MILITARY HISTORY
• MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
• MILITARY DOCTRINE
• WESTERN SECURITY(INTERNATIONAL)
• STRAITS
• FIRST WORLD WAR

Subject Categories:

• Naval Surface Warfare
• Humanities and History

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE