Accession Number:

ADA383939

Title:

Behind the Myth of the Jungle Superman: A Tactical Examination of the Japanese Army's Centrifugal Offensive, 7 December 1941 to 20 May 1942

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis 6 Aug 1999-2 Jun 2000

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2000-06-02

Pagination or Media Count:

135.0

Abstract:

This thesis studies the successful Japanese Centrifugal Offensive of 1941-42. The Japanese lacked realistic strategic objectives for the offensive, and the Imperial Japanese Army IJA, which was trained and equipped to fight the Soviet Army on the plains of Manchuria, had neither sufficient logistics structure nor appropriate equipment for a dispersed jungle campaign. Despite these severe strategic and operational failings, IJA tactical units achieved all of their objectives within six months. This study uses government documents, untranslated Japanese sources, and secondary works to examine the conscription system, training methods, equipment, and tactical doctrine that the IJA employed during the Centrifugal Offensive. The study concludes that the IJAs aggressive training methods produced a skilled army that easily adapted to the unfamiliar jungle terrain of the Southwest Pacific. while the IJAs equipment was usually ill suited for battle against the Soviets, Japanese emphasis on light weight unintentionally made the IJAs standard issue items eminently suitable for jungle operations. Likewise, the IJAs doctrine was ideal for a short, offensive jungle campaign. The Centrifugal Offensive provides evidence to the modern military leader that well-trained soldiers will adapt to unfamiliar situations without special training, and that junior leaders can learn initiative through instruction and conditioning.

Subject Categories:

  • Humanities and History
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE