The Structure of Doctrinal Revolution in the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1986.
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
Pagination or Media Count:
This monograph analyzes the shift in U.S. Army doctrine for campaign design and execution between 1968 and 1986. These dates bracket a period of major change when the Army struggled to match its doctrine with the realities of twentieth century warfare. This monograph uses ideas suggested in Thomas Kuhns book, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, to examine the forces that impelled doctrinal change, the manner in which change occurred, and the consequences. Kuhns theory also offers a standard for evaluating revolutionary change. A comparison of the role of doctrine in the Army to scientific paradigms yields the conclusion that Army doctrine conforms to scientific paradigms. This conformity permits the application of Kuhns model to analyze shifts in Army doctrine. Analysis of the changes in the Armys doctrine for campaign design and execution between 1968 and 1986 demonstrates that the shift in doctrine was revolutionary. The monograph provides valuable insights into the challenges inherent with doctrinal change. An understanding of these challenges and the reasons that anomalies occur can provide an intellectual foundation beneficial to the Army as it prepares for future warfare. New strategies, technologies, environments for waging warfare, enemies, and operational concepts are all factors that can change doctrine radically and force the Army to shift to a new doctrinal paradigm. An understanding of anomalies can provide an intellectual arsenal for contending with and overcoming the challenges likely to be encountered writing Army doctrine for the twenty-first century.
- Military Forces and Organizations
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics