Accession Number:

ADA361462

Title:

Predicting Military Innovation,

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND ARROYO CENTER SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

• Ilsaacson, Jeffrey A.
• Layne, Christopher
• Arquilla, John

Report Date:

1999-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

70.0

Abstract:

Although military technology is increasingly available and affordable, not all states have the capacity to improve military effectiveness by acquiring hardware. Indeed, integrative deficiencies-such as inflexible command structures, inappropriate doctrine and tactics, improper training, insufficient support-are quite common in the developing world. For many states, as a result, improving military effectiveness requires some level of innovation, e.g., reorganizing command structures, introducing new doctrine and tactics, modifying training techniques, and improving support. Given that improved military effectiveness generally requires innovation, what are the key indicators that intelligence analysts can use to predict whether a state is likely to achieve military innovation The literature reveals four dominant perspectives that attempt to explain military innovation structural realist neorealist, societal, organizational theory, and cultural both strategic culture and organizational culture. Drawing on these perspectives, we deduce hypotheses on military innovation that are tested in three case studies the Israeli Defense Forces 1948-1982, the North Vietnamese Army 1965-1970, and the Chaco War 1932-1935.

Descriptors:

• *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
• *MILITARY DOCTRINE
• *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
• *CASE STUDIES
• *TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
• WARFARE
• GLOBAL
• ORGANIZATIONS
• DEFENSE SYSTEMS
• THEORY
• TEACHING METHODS
• STRUCTURES
• MILITARY TRAINING
• HYPOTHESES
• ARMY
• INDICATORS
• CULTURE
• ANALYSTS
• ISRAELIS
• NORTH VIETNAM

Subject Categories:

• Military Forces and Organizations
• Defense Systems
• Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE