Accession Number:

ADA357825

Title:

Power Projection of an Army Corps by C+75 - On Target or Wishful Thinking?

Descriptive Note:

Monograph rept.,

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1998-05-01

Pagination or Media Count:

45.0

Abstract:

The U.S. Armys stated power projection strategy demands a corps of five divisions that is tailorable, sustainable, and with airborne vertical insertion capability. The lead brigade must be on the ground by C4, the lead division by C12. Two heavy divisions sealifted arrive from CONUS by C30, with the mix of armored, mechanized, or air assault units determined by the supported CINC, and relying in part on a fully supported heavy combat brigade from prepositioned stocks afloat. The full corps five divisions and a Corps Support Command closes by C75. This goal was not met during the deployment to war in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, beginning in August, 1991. That deployment took 205 days to close the force. However, since that war, steps have been taken to improve the United States strategic deployment capabilities through enhancement of the USTRANSCOMs strategic triad of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning assets, as well as through the Army Strategic Mobility Program ASMP improvement of deployment support infrastructure. The increased and improved fleets of shipping and aircraft, and the improvements to infrastructure will greatly assist in power projection from CONUS however, it is not enough for the Army to meet its ASMP goal of deploying a heavy corps in 75 days. The best that can be done in the next 5 to 10 years is closure in 120 days given current levels of resourcing.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE