Accession Number:

ADA339579

Title:

Heavy Brigade Offensive Reconnaissance Operations: A Systems Perspective.

Descriptive Note:

Monograph rept.,

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1997-12-19

Pagination or Media Count:

61.0

Abstract:

The U. S. Army over the past ten years, has enhanced the ability of heavy brigades to conduct offensive reconnaissance operations, yet brigades have not significantly attained a higher rate of success. Success is defined as the commander receiving the intelligence he requires in time to make and execute operational decisions. Systems theorist have developed a technique called systems thinking to gain perspective on such difficult problems. This monograph will determine if systems thinking can identify the source of the reconnaissance problem. The Army began to recognize the reconnaissance problem at the National Training Center NTC when it began training rotations in the early 1980s. This monograph will examine four studies that examined this reconnaissance problem at the NTC. The first three studies observed training rotations in the mid-1980s. Their conclusions and recommendations were largely implemented by the Army by the early l99Os. Unfortunately, the fourth study, published in 1996, determined that the heavy brigades still had significant problems conducting reconnaissance operations. Using a theoretical systems model based on the physical and moral environment of war, the monograph examined the mental model of the reconnaissance studies and found that the true problem is not seen. The cybernetic feedback process in the complex-adaptive command system acts as a stabilizing force. In the NTC mental model, this stabilizing force does not exist. A solution to recognize this system feedback is to educate leaders and soldiers in the moral aspects of war and its enabling and disabling effects. The training scenario should incorporate these effects as much as possible and discuss them in after action reviews. Additionally, commanders need to combine the synergistic effects of all the ground, air, and technical reconnaissance assets.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Military Intelligence

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE