Seeing the Enemy: Have We Got It Right?
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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An unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous requires warfighters to recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. This monograph provides an alternative definition which emphasizes the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and the commanders role. Accentuating the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy is important to mission execution and the development of Commanders Critical Information Requirements. This monograph examines the evolution and execution of Army doctrine during both combat and simulated combat operations to establish that there is a difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The author uses the 24th Infantry Divisions Task Force Smith and the 1st Marine Divisions performance during the Korean War to demonstrate how seeing and understanding the enemy impacts on massing combat power at the decisive point. The monograph presents the argument that reoccurring training issues experienced at the Combat Training Centers are linked to the warfighters inability to acknowledge the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. Finally, the monograph analyzes technologys impact on the Armys ability to see and understand the enemy. Realizing that modern technology improves the commanders ability to see the enemy, the author then focuses on determining whether seeing the enemy is enough. Deployment demands and a wide variety of potential threats require the warfighter to recognize the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The difference is vital to mission accomplishment.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics