Accession Number:

ADA331316

Title:

Principles of Failure: MAO TSE-Tung's Insights on Planning Military Interventions

Descriptive Note:

Monograph

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

• Mahoney, Daniel P., III

Report Date:

1997-04-07

Pagination or Media Count:

59.0

Abstract:

Mao Tse-Tung noted that the Japanese committed five major operational level mistakes during their intervention into China in 1937. He claimed that these mistakes were so severe that they would ultimately cause Japan to fail to achieve its aims. The Japanese did fail, and this monograph assumes that Maos five mistakes were the proximate cause of that failure. The apparent success of Maos prediction raises a question regarding his five observations are they unique to the Sino-Japanese conflict, or do they have more general applicability. This monograph examines Maos five mistakes to see if they can provide general insights for US planners of military interventions. The paper begins by exploring the background and execution of the Japanese intervention into China in 1937. It then continues with a discussion of Maos five Japanese mistakes. The paper next considers two other military interventions, the German intervention into Yugoslavia in 1941 and the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan in 1979. As with the Japanese intervention, the discussion covers the background and execution of both campaigns followed by an analysis of the events in terms of Maos five mistakes. The paper concludes by suggesting guidance for US planners of future military interventions based on the analysis.

Descriptors:

• *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
• *MILITARY TACTICS
• *CHINA
• MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)
• FAILURE
• JAPAN
• MILITARY PLANNING

Subject Categories:

• Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE