Accession Number:

ADA326200

Title:

Stability in South Asia,

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

• Tellis, Ashley J.

Report Date:

1997-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

91.0

Abstract:

This research effort seeks to understand the logic and prospect of deterrence breakdown in South Asia. It examines the nature of the security competition between India and Pakistan the military capabilities of both states and the impact of such capabilities on decisions relating to war and peace the national strategies of both countries and how those strategies contribute to the ongoing competition and the key indicators that the intelligence community, and DCSINT analysts in particular, should focus on when tracking the problem of South Asian instability.

Descriptors:

• *NATIONAL SECURITY
• *MILITARY CAPABILITIES
• *DETERRENCE
• MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
• INDIA
• PAKISTAN
• WARFARE
• MILITARY STRATEGY
• MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
• TRACKING
• SOUTH ASIA

Subject Categories:

• Military Forces and Organizations
• Military Intelligence

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE