The Fall and Rise of Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans.
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
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The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate international efforts at coercive diplomacy aimed at stopping the fighting in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. According to Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at Kings College, Since June 1991, the UN Security Council has adopted more than 60 resolutions and experimented with almost every available form of coercion short of war. The first UN resolution to apply coercion, in the form of an arms embargo, was passed in September 1991 with approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 713. Though international consensus was achieved with this resolution there was no consensus on the specifics of enforcing these sanctions. For the next four years, EC, US and UN actions based on similar inconsistencies failed to bring the fighting in the former Yugoslavia to a halt. Using Sir James Cables model of coercive diplomacy, this monograph examines why the efforts between 1991 and 1995 were ineffective and why in 1995, the international community was successful in bringing the warring factions to a diplomatic settlement. This paper concludes that, based on Cables model, the international community failed to solve the conflict because it used the least effective form of coercive diplomacy. When the international community finally agreed upon a course of action and implemented it with purposeful coercion, the warring parties agreed to work out a diplomatic settlement and produced the Dayton Accords. Implementation of this accord is being enforced by NATO combat forces in the former Yugoslavia, and indications are that their efforts are meeting with success.
- Government and Political Science
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics