Accession Number:

ADA312267

Title:

Strategy, Operational Art, Tactics, Concepts, and Doctrine.

Descriptive Note:

Research rept.,

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1996-06-01

Pagination or Media Count:

13.0

Abstract:

At times when no specific threats appear credible, and no scenarios cry out for attention, it might well appear that we have no strategy. That is when the dreamers must work diligently to articulate, in a self-consciously abstract manner, what military forces might be called upon to do to achieve national strategic objectives. Insofar as adversaries can be identified, and times and places established to confront them, however, the dreamers give way to the doers, who craft and execute the plans to deal with them. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on inputs from the doers to rectify the outputs of the dreamers. The so-called two Major Regional Contingency strategy places weighty demands on all the doers, not just the two commanders of the regions in which those contingencies are located. All the variables in the strategy calculus interact continually. It is very difficult to separate out any one of them, because all are interdependent. To understand the strategy for the use of naval forces, one must appreciate the concurrent use of space, force, and time and how they are deeply intertwined. The threads that tie them together are also variable in color, strength, length, and composition. Those threads are ones own fighting capabilities, the capabilities of adversaries and friends, organization, command and control, logistics, information, technology, and strategic culture. The last-named characteristic -strategic culture-is the one that molds and constrains the others. Over time, U.S. strategists have blended space, force, and time in a variety of ways to satisfy national security needs.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Intelligence

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE