U.S. Army Heavy Brigade Reconnaissance During Offensive Operations.
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
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This study examined what U.S. Army heavy brigades should accomplish when conducting reconnaissance during offensive operations, what they actually accomplish, and why there is a shortfall. Doctrinal literature from the capstone how to manual FM 100-5, Operations through FM 17-99, Scout Platoon establishes what brigade reconnaissance should accomplish. The 1987 RAND analysis, the 1988 CLLL studies, MTC take-home packages from 1991-1993, the 1993 Tait Group papers and other DESERT STORM documents identify the discrepancy between expectation and performance. The 1987 RAND study statistically correlated effective reconnaissance and successful offensive operations at the NTC. Reconnaissance during these operations was effective only 8 percent of the time. When reconnaissance was effective, offensive operations succeeded 70 percent of the time. The more assets the commander employed and the more time he gave the reconnaissance force to execute its tasks, the greater its chances for success. The 1988 CALL studies concluded that 25 percent of reconnaissance missions at the NTC were effective. Successful offensive operations followed effective reconnaissance greater than 80 percent of the time. These studies found that RS plan timeliness and scout platoon survivability were directly proportional to reconnaissance success. The NTC trend -from 1991 to 1993 reveals that the effective reconnaissance rate remains at 25 percent, but the correlation to successful offensive operations has risen to-90 percent. Commanders and staffs, especially 5-25, have problems in planning, preparing and supervising the execution of reconnaissance, partly explaining why it is not more effective.
- Military Forces and Organizations
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics