U.S. Army Intelligence in Support of 100-Hour War: Fact or Fiction/Myth or Reality?
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
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The objective of this monograph is to evaluate the performance of U.S. Army intelligence in Desert ShieldStorm. Several limitations or constraints apply. First, the paper is unclassified and, hence, specific details of several important points had to be omitted. The unclassified nature of the paper does not invalidate the conclusions, however, since most if not all of the broad concepts and operations are in unclassified sources. The monograph evaluates Army intelligence performance in light of the new intelligence environment created by Desert ShieldStorm. A unique set of external factors must be understood before an adequate assessment of Gulf War intelligence can be made. Those external factors are considered and their impact on Army intelligence discussed. The last section of the monograph evaluates Army intelligence in Desert ShieldStorm during each phase of the Intelligence Cycle. Each phase is evaluated by the authors subjective evaluation comments and observations by other authors and, when available, remarks by those who were in the war. The conclusion places the separate phase evaluations in juxtaposition to the external factors discussed to arrive at an overall conclusion of the efficacy of U.S. Army intelligence during the war.
- Military Intelligence
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics