Accession Number:

ADA289162

Title:

Operational Logic and Identifying Soviet Operational Centers of Gravity during Operation Barbarossa, 1941.

Descriptive Note:

Monograph rept.,

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

• Bongi, David J.

Report Date:

1994-05-25

Pagination or Media Count:

61.0

Abstract:

This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas 1 German planning for Operation Barbarossa 2 the operational objectives selected for the second phase of the campaign. T he second phase was selected because it was during this phase that the focus of the German military effort became diverse. Two competing strategies within the German political and military command structure caused this. While political-ideological and economic factors influenced one, purely military concerns influenced the other. In the end, the Germans diluted combat power in phase two towards three operational objectives Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine. Thus, the research question for this monograph is Which, if any, of the German operational objectives for the second phase of the campaign were also Soviet operational centers of gravity The analysis of operational objectives uses Colonel William Mendels and Colonel Lamar Tookes analytical model called Operational Logic Selecting the Center of Gravity. Potential centers of gravity are analyzed using a validity and a feasibility test.

Descriptors:

• *TACTICAL ANALYSIS
• *MILITARY PLANNING
• MATHEMATICAL MODELS
• USSR
• MILITARY HISTORY
• MILITARY PERSONNEL
• COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
• POWER
• LOGIC
• DILUTION
• GERMANY(EAST AND WEST)

Subject Categories:

• Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE