Accession Number:

ADA281255

Title:

Using Secure Coprocessors

Descriptive Note:

Doctoral thesis

Corporate Author:

CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA DEPT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

Personal Author(s):

• Yee, Bennet

Report Date:

1994-05-01

Pagination or Media Count:

104.0

Abstract:

How do we build distributed systems that are secure Cryptographic techniques can be used to secure the communications between physically separated systems, but this is not enough we must be able to guarantee the privacy of the cryptographic keys and the integrity of the cryptographic functions, in addition to the integrity of the security kernel and access control databases we have on the machines. Physical security is a central assumption upon which secure distributed systems are built without this foundation even the best cryptosystem or the most secure kernel will crumble. In this thesis, I address the distributed security problem by proposing the addition of a small, physically secure hardware module, a secure coprocessor, to standard workstations and PCs. My central axiom is that secure coprocessors are able to maintain the privacy of the data they process. This thesis attacks the distributed security problem from multiple sides. First, I analyze the security properties of existing system components, both at the hardware and software level. Second, I demonstrate how physical security requirements may be isolated to the secure coprocessor, and showed how security properties may be bootstrapped using cryptographic techniques from this central nucleus of security within a combined hardwaresoftware architecture.

Descriptors:

• *CRYPTOGRAPHY
• *DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING
• *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY
• DATA BASES
• COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
• GUARANTEES
• MACHINES
• ACCESS
• STANDARDS
• THESES
• ATTACK
• CONTROL
• REQUIREMENTS

Subject Categories:

• Computer Systems Management and Standards

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE