Accession Number:

ADA279584

Title:

America's Military Crisis-Response Capability: Is 'Anytime-Anyplace' A Realistic Expectation

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1994-02-08

Pagination or Media Count:

41.0

Abstract:

The Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disenfranchisement of its former surrogates, may increase the need for an effective military deterrent to combat terrorism. A review of Rogers Rangers during the French Indian War the first use of crisis-response type forces in America is used for historical reflection. Rogers interdicted terrorists with great strategic success. The key to their operational success was the flexibility, special training, precise planning and excellent leadership. An comparison of the Mayaguez Incident in 1975 and the Achille Lauro Hijacking in 1985, is used to chart the direction of U.S. crisis response after Desert One. The Mayaguez, represented an ad hoc approach using theater based forces. The Achille Lauro, represented a relatively mature approach following lessons-learned from Desert One. Both the Mayaguez and Achille Lauro incidents required such a rapid response that positioning a military force regardless of training or location proved nearly impossible. Complications include host nations sensitivities, lack of flexible transportation, and the arowing sophistication of terrorists. Intelligence remains the key limiting factor. Crisis-response forces must continue to develop fast, flexible transportation, access to timely intelligence and concise detailed planning. The historical window for success is the 5 to 7 day point --not the 48-60 hour window of the Mayaguez or Achille Lauro. U.S. policy should look towards the interdiction of such terrorists as Rogers Rangers did on the American Frontier.

Subject Categories:

  • Administration and Management
  • Humanities and History
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Military Intelligence
  • Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Unconventional Warfare
  • Command, Control and Communications Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE