Accession Number:

ADA279563

Title:

Planning of the First Gallipoli Amphibious Landings: An Operational Analysis

Descriptive Note:

Final rept.

Corporate Author:

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1994-06-17

Pagination or Media Count:

38.0

Abstract:

Focusing on the operational level of war, this research paper analyzes General Sir Ian Hamiltons planning of the first Gallipoli amphibious landings to derive lessons for future planners responding to a crisis with limited resources. The analysis is presented in four parts. First, the strategic background and preliminary events leading to the decision to land at Gallipoli are introduced. Second, Hamiltons plan, and rationale behind his decisions, are cited using an operational construct. Third, the plan is examined in execution to determine why the operation failed. And last, lessons are deduced. The chief finding of this study was that Hamilton had within his power the ability to accomplish his assigned mission, but it would have required near flawless application of operational art. Despite a well-conceived plan, Hamilton had shortcomings as an operational commander that kept his plan from being properly implemented. As a result, his operation failed. The paper concludes that Hamiltons shortcomings provide valuable lessons for future operational commanders and planners seeking to optimize limited resources, to include amphibious assets, in a crisis response.

Subject Categories:

  • Administration and Management
  • Humanities and History
  • Personnel Management and Labor Relations
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE