Battlefield Automation. Army Needs to Determine Command and Control Priorities and Costs
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIV
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The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing changes toward democracy in the former Soviet Union have shifted the U.S. militarys focus from a single Warsaw Pact contingency to smaller regional contingencies, such as Operation Desert Storm, which require a high degree of mobility. The Army no longer emphasizes fighting a well-known enemy on familiar battlefields with massive, forward-deployed forces in fixed positions. Instead, it must strategically deploy specific force packages with the appropriate command and control equipment at the moment of need to fight a less well-known enemy, wherever the location. According to the Army, Operation Desert Storm revealed a number of command and control shortcomings. A major deficiency was the lack of command and control on the move on the battlefield. Other developments, such as the Armys downsizing of its forces and revision of its war-fighting doctrine to account for fewer forward-deployed combat units, contributed to the need to restructure command and control and the subsequent Force Projection Army Command and Control Action Plan. The June 1993 plan, which resulted from an Army command and control effort started in February 1992, outlines a series of command and control concepts, initiatives, and recommendations for achieving effective command and control for the future force. The Army expects to implement this plan in 4 to 6 years.
- Administration and Management
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
- Command, Control and Communications Systems