Accession Number:

ADA254126

Title:

What To Do, What To Do? Determining a Course of Action at the Operational Level of War

Descriptive Note:

Monograph

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1992-05-18

Pagination or Media Count:

119.0

Abstract:

This monograph examines the adequacy of doctrinal decision making procedures for the operational level of war. These doctrinal procedures are found in emerging joint doctrine. For these procedures to be adequate, they should provide a rigorous organization of thought and action create and common, joint approach to decision-making save valuable planning time and increase probability of success on the battlefield. The focus of research is on the actions taken from receipt or recognition of a mission to the commanders selection of a course of action. To examine the question of whether an adequate process currently exists, I first briefly describe the tactical decision-making process, emphasizing its techniques for tying tactical concepts into a systematic analysis framework. I then survey both Army and Joint Staff manuals concerned with operational decision-making to determine if a process exists, and how that process compares to the tactical process relative to the adequacy criteria. From these comparisons, I conclude that while a systematic analysis model for operational decision-making exists in emerging joint doctrine, the operational decision making model does not adequately integrate operational concepts for consideration by staff and commanders. T recommend a format based on the tactical process.

Subject Categories:

  • Administration and Management
  • Government and Political Science
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE