The Secret of Future Victories
Final rept. Jun 1991-Jan 1992
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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The Army of DESERT STORM owed much to three past trainers of the Army. For much of his career, George C. Marshall argued for field exercises to supplement institutional training once raised to high command, he ordered large-scale maneuvers. World War II was won by cogent strategy, equipment good enough and plentiful, generally sound tactical doctrine, and the methodical training devised by Lesley J. McNair, who equated Realism in training to large maneuvers and live-fire exercises. McNairs methodical plan for producing divisions faltered in 1944 under the strain of battle losses, but remained the basis for Army training for Korea and Vietnam. In 1973, William E. Depuys TRADOC undertook to insure that the Army could train not only leaders at the strategic and operational levels who could draw arrows on the map to discomfit any enemy, but also units capable of advancing those arrows. Future victories depend on both superb professional schools, and maneuver units trained and commanded well enough that battle-seasoning outpaces battle losses.
- Military Forces and Organizations
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics