Accession Number:

ADA250603

Title:

Probabilistic Inference and Non-Monotonic Inference

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

ROCHESTER UNIV NY DEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1989-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

14.0

Abstract:

Since the appearance of the influential article by McCarthy and Hays, few people have tried to use probabilities as a basis for non-monotonic inference. One reason, perhaps the main one, is that probabilistic inference easily yields inconsistent bodies of knowledge, as is revealed by the lottery paradox. Here we establish three things First that standard systems of non- monotonic reasoning default logic, non-monotonic logic, and circumscription fall prey to the same lottery-like difficulties as does probabilistic inference. Second, that probabilistic inference provides equally plausible treatment of the standard examples of non-monotonic reasoning. Third, that the inconsistency threatened by the lottery paradox is a petty hodgoblin, and need not in any way interfere with the use of beliefs in planning and design.

Subject Categories:

  • Humanities and History
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE