Accession Number:

ADA250344

Title:

Against Conditional Probability

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

ROCHESTER UNIV NY DEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1989-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

17.0

Abstract:

While a minority of statisticians hew to the Bayesian line, a large number of philosophers and a large number of AI researchers take Bayesian conditionalization for granted as the only way of updating uncertainties. At the same time, everybody, Bayesian or not, appears to accept the fundamental principle of direct inference if you know the statistics, the statistics should constrain your belief. The contribution of this paper is to exhibit a conflict between these two principles, and to argue in favor of direct inference and against conditionalization.

Subject Categories:

  • Statistics and Probability

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE