Accession Number:
ADA250269
Title:
Intelligence Lessons Learned from the Battle for Crete, May 1941
Descriptive Note:
Research paper
Corporate Author:
NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS
Personal Author(s):
Report Date:
1992-06-19
Pagination or Media Count:
39.0
Abstract:
Ultra intelligence derived from the decryption of high-level German military communications nets provided the Allied forces defending Crete with extraordinary warning of the impending German air assault in May 1941. Despite the advantage of this warning, the Allies defense of Crete was unsuccessful. Examination of the preparations for the battle and of the available intelligence reveals shortcomings in the linkage between intelligence and operations which reduced the battlefield commanders ability to use the intelligence provided to him. Five intelligence lessons learned from the Battle for Crete are the need to plan to ensure continuous availability of intelligence throughout an operation, the criticality of communications to intelligence, the need for the commander to understand intelligence to use it effectively, the problems associated with source protection, and the inevitability of ambiguity in intelligence.
Descriptors:
- *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
- *LESSONS LEARNED
- *AIR STRIKES
- *BATTLES
- *GERMANY(EAST AND WEST)
- *SECOND WORLD WAR
- *MEDITERRANEAN SEA ISLANDS
- COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
- LANDING FIELDS
- DEFENSE PLANNING
- PARATROOPERS
- WIRELESS LINKS
- UNITED KINGDOM
- DECODING
- GLIDERS
- AMBIGUITY
- MILITARY COMMANDERS
- AVAILABILITY
- CRYPTOGRAPHY
- MILITARY HISTORY
Subject Categories:
- Humanities and History
- Military Intelligence
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics