The Malvinas Conflict: Argentine Practice of the Operational Art
Monograph rept. AY89/90
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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This monograph focuses on Argentinian practice of the Operational Art during the MalvinasFalklands conflict of 1982. It seeks to determine to what extent Argentinas defeat can be attributed to shortcomings at the operational level. Following a review of Argentinian doctrine, the Argentinian operational proficiency is evaluated using the following criteria reasonableness of assumptions consideration of branches and sequels center of gravity analysis and adequacy of the sustainment effort. The monograph concludes that Argentinian of the Operational Art was inadequate, and contributed to the defeat. It suggests that the principal error made was the failure to develop branches to the basic plan that addressed possible and dangerous contingencies.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics